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With the beginning of airline deregulation in 1978, U.S. domestic operations were in for a period of turmoil, adjustment, vibrancy, entrepreneurship, and change. A great deal has been written about the effects of deregulation on airlines and their personnel, and on the public at large.
Less attention has been paid to the effects on travel agents and on the seminal role of computerized reservation systems (CRSs) in the flowering of travel agencies. This article examines both of these phenomena.
The travel agent has always had a nodal role in selling the stock in trade of the air carriers, their seats. Without travel agents, air carriers would have to set up costly distribution systems of their own.
With the ubiquitous presence of travel agents throughout the length and breadth of the land, airlines have been saved the considerable expense of investing in their own bricks and mortar, personnel, etc, leaving themselves free to put this money into, and to concentrate on, the direct provision of armchairs in the sky.
As it is, most major airlines still keep a presence of their own in certain select, prestigious, upscale communities located in major metropolitan areas. These are, however, exceptions. The eyes and ears of air carriers are, and have been, the travel agents. Agencies have, in the past, frequently been relatively small, undercapitalized, "mom and pop," shoestring operations.l Nevertheless, they still performed an essential function for the airlines. Their goodwill was assiduously courted, even by the highest flying carriers.
Since deregulation, the role of the travel agent has undergone what amounts to a metamorphosis. Historically important, the travel agent has now assumed a crucial role for air carriers in their marketing strategies. Perhaps the most obvious change that has occurred has been the vast proliferation of agency outlets since deregulation. Exhibit 1 shows this development, together with the parallel change in travel agencies' sales and commission rates. What has also happened is that the industry has undergone several fundamental changes in the wake of these impressive increases in loca- 
Technology Has Caused Changes
Perhaps the single most important factor in the changing nature of the domestic travel agency business has been the change in technology. Although the new technology predated deregulation, it has really come into its own in response to the deregulation phenomenon.
In order to compete more effectively in a deregulated environment, the larger air carriers have installed a complex computerized system to manage their reservations, ticketing procedures, and flight scheduling. Only travel agencies that have been able to buy or lease their own terminals and keep up with all the costs associated with an expensive and rapidly-changing technology have been able to survive3
Access to the latest technology has not been the only prerequisite for travel agents successfully surviving the anfractuosity of regulation deregulation. Equally as important has been the need to develop managerial skills that can cope with the complex morass of everchanging fares. Just staying on top of this kaleidoscope has earned successful travel agents their increased commissions. Not surprisingly, it is becoming more difficult for a travel agent to have the necessary capital and managerial skills and still operate as a businessman who is a sole proprietor -the classic atomistic competitor described by economists. Larger scale organization is now required.
Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act, travel agents had exclusive The first two systems to come on line were United Airlines' APOLLO in 1976 and American Airlines' SABRE, followed later by TWA's PARS.
As can be seen from Exhibit 2, the three airlines that were the first to establish on-line computer reservations systems are the ones with both the largest number of outlets and the largest shares of domestic revenues today. The only change is that SABRE has overtaken APOLLO as the leading computer system. 
Revenue Is Concentrated
Another way of looking at the Department of Justice's concern is to understand, from Exhibit 2, that 65 percent of travel agency locations produced 88 percent of domestic revenues.
In and of itself, such concentmtion may have produced no more than some momentary qualms on the part of the DOJ, later to be overcome by the thought that in classical economics, the more efficient, more effective competitor can expect to obtain a sales advantage over his less efficient opponent. This concentration in the CRS was not, however, the whole story by any means. The airlines that created the various computer reservation systems controlled, of course, the programming of these systems. Naturally, American would present its flights first on its SABRE system; United would do so on APOLLO.' For now, the matter rests there. American's and United's competitors are trying to come up with an alternative to SABRE and APOLLO. These competitors have also initiated a formal antitrust suit against the two dominant airlines.
